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ABSTRACT: The potential for experts to exploit their positions of authority requires attention to the role of 
epistemic work as part of the social division of labour. Expertise has not become so distant from social hierarchy 
as we sometimes fancy, and evaluating expertise requires political analysis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Authority and trust have always raised questions for feminist scholars:Why do women and 
other socially marginalized people suffer disproportionately under supposedly just authorities? 
Why do we trust authorities that deny our moral and rational status, even refusing to count us 
as normal human beings for clinical trials? Understandings and procedures that count as 
expertise, such as the practice of giving women medicine tested only on men, contribute to 
women’s suffering and marginalization.  
 Among the forms of expertise that have done damage to women, including legal 
expertise, the rise of medical expertise has been most cruelly ironic, Lorraine Code argues. The 
rise of medical science took over by various means the midwifery and lay-healing performed 
primarily by working-class women and thus subjected all women to the authority of white 
upper-class men. Likewise child-rearing and housework became matters in which women are 
no longer trusted but taken to need instruction and monitoring. So women have come to lack 
authority in the very domains that define their own gender and that submissiveness has come to 
define the gender. “When possibilities of being a ‘good enough’ woman and mother depend on 
relinquishing trust in their own skills in favor of a more distinguished expertise, it is not 
surprising that women would do what was expected of them.” (Code, 1991, p. 207). The 
expectation that women will be trusting makes women especially vulnerable to self-doubt and 
inclined to defer to experts. The authority of experts draws further sustenance from and 
meaningfully contrasts with the cultural conflation of femininity with pathology (Code, 1991, 
pp. 203–219). 
 For a few years I’ve been struggling to engage the feminist critiques of science, 
medicine, and technology with accounts of how expertise operates in argumentation. However, 
the current analysis of ad verecundiam arguments ignores forms of authority that intersect with 
expertise, and argumentation theorists in general assume equal social status among 
interlocutors and thus seem oblivious to the principles of feminist analysis. The contemporary 
focus on expertise in accounts of the fallacy of appeal to authority suggests that other forms of 
authority are no longer important or problematic. Fortunately, authority receives more complex 
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analysis from the rhetoricians in the field. Jean Goodwin has opened up the discussion of 
authority to provide greater attention to the role of social status, looking back to its significance 
for the Roman orator Cicero (2001), and noting its centrality to John Locke’s introduction of 
the term ad verecundiam.  
 Expertise has become increasingly possible as our society develops more forms of 
specialized labour and forms of knowledge to support that diversification. The transition from 
hierarchies of religion and aristocracy, such as in ancient Rome, to hierarchies influenced more 
by specialized knowledge has many implications for individual reasoning and argumentation. 
The intertwining of social hierarchies plays only a limited role in Goodwin’s account of 
expertise as a principle-agent problem but her model opens up many social considerations. The 
trust that she recognizes to underpin expertise is subject to exploitation in a way that demands 
attention to hierarchical intersections, including gender, race, and class hierarchies.  
2. EXPERTISE AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
In contemporary scholarly contexts, the term “authority” often refers almost exclusively to 
expertise, also referred to as “epistemic” and sometimes “cognitive” authority, leaving behind 
the authorities of dignity and command recognized by Locke and Richard Whately, and the 
ordinary language of “calling in the authorities” to indicate the need for policing and 
regulation. Arguments that appeal to expertise have extensive company among forms of 
defeasible or presumptive reasoning. Other “schemes” for presumptive argumentation include 
ad verecundiam’s Lockean sisters ad hominem and ad ignorantiam but extend far beyond. A 
good deal if not all of reasoning and argumentation can be understood in this fashion, as 
dependent on defeasible inference patterns. However, expertise and appeals to it—good and 
bad—also depend on contingent social structures. Expertise functions in much the same way as 
other forms of authority, and it rests on the same foundations as the authorities of command 
and dignity, on social structures and status within them. Social diversification provides the 
need for expertise and resources for the education that provides the knowledge. 
 Recognizing expertise as a specialized form of authority does not reduce it in any 
simple fashion to status, but indicates how status makes expertise possible. Sometimes our 
expertise may account only for artefacts of social structures, such as when directory assistance 
provides phone numbers or information staff in an airport or shopping mall provide directions 
for the space. Experts also guide us regarding non-social phenomena, but we need not get into 
debates over realism to say that social structures make possible the types of engagement in the 
physical world that allow a person to become, say, a physicist or an engineer. Developing these 
specializations depends on technologies, schools, and professional associations, as well as on 
teaching and mentoring. 
 Reliance on expertise has increased in recent centuries as the division of epistemic 
labour brings with it the division of epistemic authority (Anderson, 1995, p. 59; Code, 1995, p. 
175). We have no more polymaths; we cannot ‘have it all’ epistemically regardless of wealth, 
and much of our knowledge has become esoteric. 
A layperson defers to the authority of experts, not because in so doing one is guaranteed the truth-
of-the-matter, but because one lacks the means to determine the issue oneself. In deferring to 
experts, one is not deferring simply to particular knowledge claims, but to a process for making 
those claims. (Pierson, 1995, p. 402)  
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In democracies, especially those based on representation, processes and documents as much as 
people hold and convey authority, moving away from the personal authority of aristocracy, 
which was more important in Rome than any other authority.  
Despite the Roman pride in their legal expertise, despite their pride in their military discipline, 
auctoritas was their preferred method of social control. Thus it is notorious that in Republican times 
there were no police within the city limits of Rome; order was maintained instead by an often 
symbolic display of personal dignity. (Goodwin, 1998, p. 277). 
As sources of authority can become disembodied, moving beyond individual humans, they can 
rematerialize in such things as timetables (Walton, 1997), academic disciplines and methods 
(Hundleby, 2010), and even web sites. The division of cognitive labour and the proliferation of 
forms of expertise give expertise a systematic nature.   
 Specialization and correspondingly accreditation have proliferated with the growth of 
science and technology, in turn encouraging the development of education as an industry. 
Training has long been a prerequisite for the authority of command, but the demand for 
education has increased such that we have training for pretty much every job or vocation. 
While experience may sometimes substitute for education and accreditation in seeking a 
position of authority, training has become the gold standard because it guarantees a degree of 
expertise; we even have a distinct sector to the workforce described as “information 
technology.” Education has become an industry in its own right, supported not only by 
governments and private endowments but by profit. 
3. FORMS OF AUTHORITY 
To distinguish among different types of authority Goodwin (1998) looks at the forms of 
corresponding recourse for not following authority. Refusal to defer to dignity by exhibiting 
reverence amounts to impudence and invites shame; refusal of command is disobedient and 
risks loss of position or punishment; while refusal of expertise is imprudent and risks loss of 
resources, including the willingness of others to cooperate.1 These forms of authority 
intertwine in ways that aid the functioning of expertise. They connect to each other by social 
networks more general than and underpinning the systems that provide dignity. Such prestige 
is merely an especially high form of social status, I suggest, that in specific forms also includes 
the authority of command. 
 Goodwin argues that the types can be clearly distinguished despite how they 
compound and complement each other: “Authorities, like other goods, are often distributed on 
the principle that to those who have shall be given more” (1998, p. 273). So, those who are 
learned are given the authority of command and those who are able to wield command are 
granted status to support it. Goodwin maintains nonetheless that refusal to any authority 
reflects clear delineation among the three forms. So, for example, “the student history paper 
which is not typed as required is disobedient, the student history paper contradicting the 
instructor on a date, imprudent.” (1998, p. 273)  
 That infringements of authority can sometimes be specifically diagnosed does not 
entail that forms of authority often operate independently. In particular, a degree of expertise 
                                                
1 The taxonomy is summarized in Hansen (2006), p. 323. 
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belongs to all forms of authority. A senator knows how to behave like senator, which many do 
not, and any officer has technical understanding about protocol. 
 The diversification of labour gives expertise such an important role in our society that 
we accord experts an elevated status—titles, good salaries, and general influence—that makes 
their authority complex, involving other forms. A person may be esteemed and granted 
significant prestige because of his knowledge or for that same expertise he may receive an 
administrative position and the power of command. An elevated position of some kind helps to 
mark expertise, and can also aid in its operation. Among experts, we prefer a plumber who can 
also order the materials for her recommended options, and a midwife to whom physicians will 
listen. Their authorities of command and dignity, respectively, are not specifically epistemic 
aspects of their power or not intrinsically matters of expertise but nonetheless contribute to 
their status and function as experts. Complementary forms of authority increase the relevance 
of an expert’s knowledge. 
3. DIGNITY AND BIAS 
Dignity may seem to be old-fashioned, mostly obsolete. Even if it once influenced other forms 
of authority, many of us like to think we can accord someone dignity without believing what 
the dignitary says. However, recent work in the psychology of bias suggests differently: 
prestige can have a profound effect on people’s evaluation and proper comportment can 
influence behaviours, decisions, and beliefs that seem independent of courtesy. Perceived 
social status is basic and remains standard, even generic to our engagement with other people. 
It certainly affects discursive authority in the sense of who gets to speak and who is heard; 
these elements of testimony are important for argumentation and public reasoning, and hence 
for expertise.  
 Dignity like command does not operate generically but provides exceptional status, 
say belonging to a religious figure or hero. Yet both connect from broader forms of authority 
and they are related to each other as forms of high regard. The status of dignity operates more 
loosely than the status of command and also has a more subtle influence. Fulfilling the 
obligations of etiquette often is more subject to interpretation than following an order. The 
authority of command is treated together with other social authorities by Douglas Walton 
(1997). His terminology of “administrative authority” might encompass dignity too, but it 
assumes a formality to social authority less common and less acceptable in democracies than in 
aristocracies.  
 Hierarchical distinctions that are important to reasoning in discursive contexts can be 
quite broad, operating generically; they need not grant exceptional status in the manner of the 
prestige providing for command or traditional dignity. The commonplace social ranks follow 
lines of race, class, and gender. Biases against people with lower social status and for people 
with higher social status are part of status quo bias which outweighs in-group preference. Thus 
white people tend to be perceived as generally good by the overwhelming majority of North 
Americans taking the implicit association test or IAT (https://implicit.harvard.edu/ 
implicit/demo/), regardless of the tester’s own racial identity and political views on race. No 
matter how opposed to racism one is one may show these unconscious biases (Jost, Mahzarin, 
& Nosek, 2004). Likewise, my decades of work on feminist research and identification as a 
“career woman” do not prevent me from testing with a moderate bias against associating 
women with careers. Bias against women in careers and in science is common across cultures 
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and identities. More specific social evidence of these biases has been available for decades 
from studies of job and tenancy applications, for instance, revolutionizing some interview 
practices such as for orchestras. They now use screens to blind auditions and as a result employ 
many more women than before. Likewise, to be fair to our students we must view their work as 
anonymously as possible when evaluating it. 
 Despite our romanticism about the equalitarian nature of democracy, broad 
contemporary social categories relate closely to traditional dignity. We accord people with 
something-like-dignity in ways that we often do not recognize but that can have profound 
effects. Ordinary social divisions cumulatively may accord a level of status reminiscent of a 
Roman senator’s dignity. Admittedly, white, middle-class, straight men are not elevated so 
much as they are taken to be standard, but that is the ideal position in a democracy, analogous 
to classical dignity. What is typical (in some sense) and viewed as being usual is also 
considered ideal. The rest of us have relatively compromised status (although some white, 
middle-class, straight young men face other forms of marginalization).  
 Trust operates implicitly in democratically tolerated forms of oppression. We adhere 
more strictly to gendered and raced behaviour in strange environments because maximizing 
our predictability helps us work with others. People become extremely confused and even 
unable to think and act in the face of indeterminate gender and sometimes for indeterminate 
race and age. We can better anticipate the behaviour of individuals whom we can locate along 
these axes (Ridgeway, 2011). We trust our social presumptions and that other people will 
conform to them; others do conform because they are trying to negotiate a world structured by 
the same roles. Consider that women and people of colour smile more than white men; it’s 
typical of subordinates, stereotypical, and can be a reliable way to minimize social hindrances 
but it is a burden and creates an unequal discursive environment. 
 The social status that adheres when one is on the beneficiary side of lines of 
oppression thus can be understood as a generic form of authority. However modest this dignity 
it can sometimes amounts to the authority of command via its testimonial effects. Statements 
from white men carry weight; statements made by people of colour carry less, even among 
those sharing their ethnicity; women tend to be interrupted more than men even by other 
women. A man can be proud to be a man, in a way that people can rarely be proud of anything 
else except other dominant social statuses. Although it may be unacceptable in many contexts 
to appeal directly to one’s masculinity, standards for politeness are gender-specific, demanding 
assertiveness from men and supporting roles from women and people of colour. The dynamics 
of compound privileges can also make the elevation to one’s status consistent and resilient. 
The prestige is merely less explicit than the traditional authority of dignity, and people are less 
conscious of its operation. 
4. POWER, TRUST AND EXPERTISE 
Violence and other forms of power lack the trust characteristic of authority (Goodwin, 2001, p. 
51). “The kind of authority that is everywhere and always open to challenge is . . . no authority 
at all” (Hanrahan & Anthony, 2005, p. 64) and so authority is the place where explanation, at 
least provisionally, stops. While good authority is in principle subject to scrutiny, in practice I 
must trust you to a degree if I have you take on any task for me, whatever that task might be: 
shovelling snow or diagnosing my headaches. Our trust in experts may be engendered and 
secured in various ways: I can oversee and note the impact of your work or advice, but the 
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trustworthiness of experts is distinctly difficult to assess. The power of expertise can be 
evaluated and challenged, as feminist critiques of medicine show, and there may be increasing 
need to seek out such challenges. 
 What qualifies experts is that they have epistemic skills we lack, abilities to examine 
and understand. Experts hold power not only by way of complementary authorities for 
command and dignity; they make certain courses of action possible by giving novices 
instruction and confidence, opening up the recommended paths and making other choices more 
awkward (Goodwin, 2001, p. 50).  
 Expertise is notoriously difficult to assess. Like many of us, I cannot judge well the 
quality of work done by a plumber in the way I can the mowing of a lawn. Or to bring back the 
medical case, I can judge skill in bandaging but not in delivering a baby. Those physicians who 
specialize sometimes do so because of their inept bedside manner, so that my attempt to judge 
a physician’s expertise based on his apparent ease may be systematically mistaken. On the 
other hand experts cannot judge other true experts if their skills are so close that they overlap, 
Alvin Goldman (2011) argues.  
 Because the ability of the putative expert to serve our needs cannot be adequately 
scrutinized and evaluated, it is difficult to justify our trust. The more we can oversee the less 
we need to trust. The problem is akin to the Euthyphro dilemma: Do we trust experts because 
they have cognitive authority or do they have cognitive authority because we trust them? In 
causal sequence our trust gives people cognitive authority in the sense of licensing them to 
investigate and advise; but ideally we come to trust people because they have cognitive 
authority in the sense of understanding, demonstrated already to some degree.  
 In the cases of medicine usurping midwifery and trials based on male subjects only, 
the putative experts did not deserve trust. Trust seems to have derived from social privilege, 
especially the gender and class status, an analysis that shows how other privileges of any kind 
involve trust that can be exploited to acquire expert status. The opacity of expertise may make 
it especially vulnerable to confusion with other forms of authority. Expertise may be especially 
compromised in technological democracies given the insidious nature of social status and 
rendering expertise especially in need of critique. 
5. TRUST 
An analysis of the ways that expertise goes wrong and trust is violated requires attention 
beyond the individuals in the exchange. It takes us back to the division of labour in which 
expertise is just one form of authority, one among several ways in which we entrust people. 
The more official this trust, the more likely that the trust is recognized to depend on authority, 
yet I have suggested that dignity operates in subtle but powerful ways. Gender and race have 
the company of more official institutions that have more transparent guarantees of expert 
services, and more trustworthy sources for the authority of individual experts. Just as official 
institutions encourage us to trust some people as experts, social institutions likewise affect who 
receives expert credibility, authorizing and deauthorizing both individuals and whole 
traditions.  
 To solve the apparent dilemma of expertise and provide a basis for trust Goodwin 
suggests a model of individual exchange. “Someone—the "principal"—needs to retain 
someone else—an "agent"—to do something she cannot or does not want to do for herself” 
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(Goodwin, 2010, p. 136) An individual expert stakes her dignity on the correctness of her 
claims.  
In appealing to authority, the speaker offers her dignity as a hostage for her judgment, wagers it on 
her judgment, or, to use another analogy, posts it as a bond guaranteeing the correctness of her 
judgment. (Goodwin 2001, p. 51) 
Because of this stake, trust is not just given but earned, Goodwin argues (2001). The principle 
becomes empowered by expert advice insofar as being granted with the power to challenge the 
status of the expert. A physician can be shown to have provided a misdiagnosis, a teacher a 
false set of information, and such risk accrues to all offers of expertise. The expert has been 
authorized to perform a certain sort of labour and that authorization can be retracted, by the 
principle or the monitoring body, she suggests. The risk taken by experts depends on their self-
presentation and the risk of appearing fraudulent and thus provides a reputational bond. 
Credentials are guarantees of expertise only insofar as they guarantee good behaviour: the 
licensing body may respond and there are other systems of accountability. Likewise, 
contributors on webpages may be trusted not because we know who they are (and sometimes 
especially because of their anonymity which can encourage honesty). Whether we trust them 
depends on the structure of the web site and the standards it follows. Online personas are 
sometimes carefully cultivated in ways well deserving of trust (Goodwin, 2011). 
 Goodwin’s principle-agent model thus demands we are not alone in our relationships 
with experts, yet monitoring bodies are not adequate support for trust among individuals. 
Neither the risk of adverse selection or the hazard of individual immorality or irresponsibility 
can account for the exploitation of women by the medical industry, how a whole expert 
profession can perpetrate an injustice and falsehood. As Code explains: 
The rhetoric of voluntary agreement cannot account for the politics of trusting . . . Trust-based 
relationships lend themselves readily to the forms of exploitation to which women of all classes, 
races, ages, and persuasions have long been subject. (1991, pp. 184–185)2  
A political account of trust can be found in social contract theories from Plato through Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rawls. Recently Miranda Fricker (1998) uses it to indicate the fundamental nature 
of testimonial authority to our social means of understanding, and Charles Mills (1997) shows 
how exploitative it can be, arguing that the social order of Western democracies rests on the 
exploitation of people of colour.  
  Goodwin suggests that we scholars need to attend to the specific techniques used to 
develop trust, a piece of advice that directs us to social contracts operating in the background: 
Where [the principle] may not have experience with this physician, for example, she does have 
experience with the medical system as a whole; and if her experience is good, she has some reason 
for confidence in the judgments of the Board of Medical Examiners and other professional 
organizations. (Goodwin, 2010, p. 141) 
                                                
2  Code suggests the general epistemological model of friendship, which is as individualist as Goodwin’s. I am 
not sure how Code has developed her account of trust in her most recent work (2006) but a word search of it 
suggests that she has left behind “friendship” as the model.  
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The larger structures of authority that set the stage for novices to engage expert authorities 
include structures that give rise to the authorities of dignity and command; we must beware 
their effects, both beneficial and pernicious. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our ability to judge trustworthiness itself needs to become specialized to fit our age of 
expertise. The opacity of expertise renders it especially vulnerable to confusion with other 
forms of authority, and thus to exploitation in the service of other forms of power, such as 
gender, race, and class privilege. Goodwin argues that we escape the dilemma of judging the 
authority of experts by way of our ability to judge general trustworthiness (2010, p. 141). Her 
strategy is on the right track but stops short. Some of our ability to judge is pervaded by 
systems of social authority. We have distinct reasons to trust experts that do not hold for other 
authorities, but these do not ease the problem.  
 The motivations people have for becoming experts will include those for becoming 
authorities of any kind, such as an ambitious disposition (‘I climbed it because it was there’), 
the desire for power or personal gain, the intention to do good, the invigoration of competition, 
and the desire to contribute to society. More specific purposes will attract people to expertise 
as a form of authority over others, such as the love of learning, the desire to understand 
something in particular, and the intention to contribute to social knowledge. These more 
specialized motivations seem less vulnerable to corruption than those driving authority in 
general. Certainly expertise can make one more able to be a trickster and a con artist, but those 
do not rank highly among long-term personal ambitions. Should one have expertise in 
psychology or rhetoric and apply it to merchandising, there obtains a sense that one has “sold 
out” relative to other experts.  
 Nevertheless, expertise will attract those seeking obscure power; it is intrinsically ripe 
for corruption; and the implicit authority granted according to the status quo may mask poor 
excuses for expertise. Institutions that govern professions and practices may not be sufficient 
deterrent, and themselves engrained in the existing systems of power. Status quo thinking 
operates as the default. To scrutinize the politics of expertise requires special effort and 
attention to liberatory analysis and critiques. 
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